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VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION OF INMATES FOR REDUCED
PRISON SENTENCES
ELISE B. ADAMS*
In May 2017, a Tennessee judge issued a standing order allowing inmates to receive thirty
days’ jail credit in exchange for undergoing a voluntary sterilization procedure. Although
the order was ultimately rescinded, this Article will address the constitutional and ethical
concerns that a district court would have considered had the order not been rescinded.
While inmates can always choose to waive their constitutional rights, the coercive nature
of prisons—explained in the unconstitutional conditions doctrine—may compromise a
prisoner’s ability to provide voluntary consent. The constitutionality of the order largely
depends on the level of scrutiny a court applies. Regardless of the order’s constitutionality,
the adverse ethical and social ramifications outweigh any potential benefits that could come
from such an order. This order would also give too much power to state governments over
an individual’s reproductive freedoms. Instead of automatically reducing an inmate’s
sentence after undergoing a sterilization procedure, drug offenders should have the
opportunity to choose from several different birth control options that could possibly lead
to a reduced sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
What lengths would you go to snip thirty days off your prison sentence?
Many inmates in White County, Tennessee asked themselves this very question in
May 2017, after Judge Sam Benningfield signed a standing order1 allowing inmates
to receive jail credit in exchange for undergoing a procedure providing long-term
birth control, which included either a vasectomy2 for males or a Nexplanon
implant3 for females—a procedure that usually makes women infertile for
approximately three years.4 Inmates could receive two days’ credit for completing
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1. Sam Benningfield, J., Standing Order (May 15, 2017).
2. A vasectomy is a permanent surgical sterilization procedure that prevents sperm from
entering the semen. Vasectomy, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (last visited October 29, 2017), https://
www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/birth-control/vasectomy.
3. Nexplanon is a small plastic rod that is surgically implanted into the arm and provides birth
control for up to three years, after which it must be removed and replaced. What is NEXPLANON
(Etonogestrel Implant)?, NEXPLANON (last visited October 29, 2017), https://www.nexplanon.com/whatis-nexplanon/.
4. Benningfield, supra note 1.
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a Neonatal Syndrome Education Program5 and an additional thirty days’ credit if
they underwent a long-term birth control procedure.6 While the order was in
effect, thirty-two women received Nexplanon implants and thirty-eight men
signed up to receive vasectomies.7 These men and women represented
approximately thirty-two percent of the jail’s daily population.8
To become eligible to receive the sterilization procedure9 and subsequent
sentence reduction, inmates first had to attend the Neonatal Program, which
taught them about how prenatal drug use can affect fetal development.10 Because
the order itself did not specify who was eligible to receive the sentence reduction,
Judge Benningfield later released a statement clarifying that those eligible for free
contraceptive services would also be eligible to receive the thirty-day credit.11 This
statement also specified that males under the age of twenty-one could not
participate in the program but did not set an age limitation for women.12
Additionally, inmates had to receive a full physical examination and wait thirtydays before undergoing the procedure.13 The program was only offered to those
sentenced out of the General Sessions Court,14 so inmates serving sentences for
serious felony offenses were not eligible to receive the reduced sentence.15
However, sign-up sheets and pamphlets describing the order were distributed

5. The program is offered by the Tennessee Department of Health and teaches inmates about the
dangers of prenatal drug use. See Hayley Mason, Judge Under Scrutiny for Offering Reduced Sentences for
Vasectomies, Birth Control Implants, WSMV NEWS 4 (July 28, 2017), https://www.wsmv.com/news/judgeunder-scrutiny-for-offering-reduced-sentences-for-vasectomies-birth/article_6126e9c1-ec01-5b388cc0-9f568f47fd62.html.
6. Id.
7. Derek Hawkins, Judge to Inmates: Get Sterilized and I’ll Shave off Jail Time, WASHINGTON POST
(July 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/07/21/judge-toinmates-get-sterilized-and-ill-shave-off-jail-time/?utm_term=.71f72fa4f95d.
8. Jessica Lussenhop, ‘We Were Guinea Pigs’: Jailed Inmates Agreed to Birth Control, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 18, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40955288 (“With an average daily
population of 221 inmates, that represented a sizeable portion of the jail.”).
9. Judge Benningfield asserts that “sterilization is never involved and is not an option as all
procedures offered are reversible.” Press Release, Sam Benningfield, J., http://spartalive.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/Judges-Statement.pdf. However, for clarity and efficiency, this Article will
refer to the procedure as a sterilization procedure because Nexplanon is considered short-term
sterilization.
10. Id.
11. Id. This is presuming that those who are fertile and of child-bearing years are eligible to receive
free contraceptive services.
12. Id.
13. Gina Cherelus, Tennessee Inmates Offered Less Jail Time in Return for Vasectomies, REUTERS (July
21, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tennessee-vasectomy/tennessee-inmatesoffered-less-jail-time-in-return-for-vasectomies-idUSKBN1A625N.
14. The General Sessions Court mimics the duties of a federal magistrate judge. About General
Sessions Courts, TENN. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CT., http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/courts/general-sessionscourts/about (last visited Feb. 17, 2018). The court’s criminal jurisdiction “is limited to preliminary
hearings in felony cases and misdemeanor trials in which a defendant waives the right to a grand jury
investigation and trial by jury in Circuit or Criminal Court.” Id.
15. Benningfield, supra note 9.
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throughout White County Jail’s general population areas, where many inmates
not sentenced by the General Sessions Court resided.16
The motive behind the order was simple. Judge Benningfield asserted that he
was forced to remove children from the custody of their previously incarcerated
mothers “because [these children] were born addicted to drugs or dependant [sic]
and neglected” as a result of their parent’s drug use.17 Judge Benningfield’s order
was an attempt to reduce both the number of children born with health problems
caused by in utero drug exposure as well as the number of children who would
eventually end up in foster care.18
Despite his good intentions, Judge Benningfield’s order received nationwide
criticism from civil rights attorneys, health officials, and the general public.19 The
Tennessee American Civil Liberties Union issued a statement saying that the order
“violates the fundamental constitutional right to reproductive autonomy and
bodily integrity by interfering with the intimate decision of whether and when to
have a child, imposing an intrusive medical procedure on individuals who are not
in the position to reject it.”20 District Attorney Bryant Dunaway, who oversees the
prosecution of defendants in White County, said that it was concerning that a
young defendant could receive an irreversible procedure that would ultimately
impact the rest of his life.21 Judge Benningfield claimed he created the order after
being approached by the Tennessee Department of Health.22 The Department,
however, denied being involved in “developing any policy to offer sentence
reductions to those convicted of crimes in exchange for their receiving family
planning services.”23 The Department stated that it “[does] not support any policy
that could compel incarcerated individuals to seek any particular health
services.”24
Inmates were able to sign up to receive sterilization procedures for
approximately two months before Judge Benningfield rescinded the order.25 These
inmates who signed up to receive the procedure and who “demonstrated to the
court their desire to improve their situations and take serious and considered steps
toward their rehabilitation by having the procedure” ultimately received the
16. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 9, Sullivan v. Benningfield, No.
17-cv-00052 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 9, 2017), ECF No. 13.
17. Benningfield, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. Derek Hawkins, Tennessee Judge, Under Fire, Pulls Offer to Trade Shorter Jail Sentences for
Vasectomies, WASHINGTON POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morningmix/wp/2017/07/28/tennessee-judge-under-fire-pulls-offer-to-trade-shorter-jail-sentences-forvasectomies/?utm_term=.6e85d4e1ce9d.
20. Press Release from Hedy Weinberg, Exec. Dir., ACLU-TN, ACLU-TN Statement on White
County Inmate Sterilization and Birth Control Program (July 19, 2017), http://www.aclu-tn.org/aclutn-statement-on-white-county-sterilization-program/.
21. Veronika Bondarenko, Tennessee Jails Have Been Shortening Sentences for Inmates who Get
Vasectomies or Birth Control Implants, BUSINESS INSIDER (July 20, 2017, 8:42 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/tennessee-jails-offer-vasectomies-for-reduced-sentence-2017-7.
22. Benningfield, supra note 9.
23. Hawkins, supra note 7.
24. Id.
25. Sam Benningfield, J., Order Rescinding Previous Standing Order (July 26, 2017).

Adams Final Article 3.0 (Do Not Delete)

26 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

12/15/2018 4:02 PM

Volume 26:23 2018

thirty-day credit, even after the program was rescinded.26 Most of the women who
signed up for the order actually received Nexplanon; male inmates who signed up
for the order did not receive a vasectomy.27 Although the order was rescinded just
two months after its initial issuance, Judge Benningfield was reprimanded by the
Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct.28
The question now becomes, why should we care? The order has been
rescinded; Judge Benningfield has been publicly scolded and sanctioned; and
other judges will think twice before offering criminal defendants any sort of
benefit for undergoing a sterilization procedure. Nevertheless, the underlying
issue the order attempted to resolve still exists. The United States is currently in
the throes of an opioid epidemic; from 2003 to 2012, the number of drugdependent infants grew nearly fivefold.29 The cost of treating these infants is
exorbitant: “[H]ospitalization costs rose to $1.5 billion in 2012, from $732 million
in 2009.”30 Because many of the parents of opioid-dependent infants are lowincome, Medicaid is forced to cover eighty percent of the associated hospital
costs.31 Judge Benningfield attempted to “fix” the problem by preventing drugusers from procreating—thereby, supposedly decreasing the number of drugdependent babies.
This Article not only examines whether Judge Benningfield’s order is
constitutional, but also discusses the social and ethical ramifications of this type of
order. Part II of this Article examines the history of both involuntary and voluntary
sterilization in the United States. Part III considers the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and discusses whether procreation is a fundamental right. Part III also
discusses the level of scrutiny to apply and determines whether the order falls
outside the scope of the judiciary. Ultimately, the order’s constitutionality is
contingent on the level of scrutiny a court would employ to determine whether it
infringes on an inmate’s right to reproduce. Part IV briefly discusses the social and
ethical ramifications and proposes a less coercive alternative to Judge
Benningfield’s order.
Even if a court determines that the order is constitutional, the detrimental
social consequences greatly outweigh any potential benefits that could come from
sterilizing prison inmates. The right to procreate is too critical of a right for the
judiciary to regulate without legislative approval. Instead of automatically
reducing an inmate’s sentence after she has undergone a sterilization procedure,
26. Id.
27. See Hawkins, supra note 7.
28. Press Release, The Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, Board of Judicial Conduct
Complaints File Nos. B17-7052, B17-7055 and B17-7144 (Nov. 20, 2017), http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/judge_benningfield_-_bjc_letter_of_public_reprimand_2017nov20.pdf.
Judge Benningfield was reprimanded for violating Rule 1.1 (Compliance with the Law) and Rule 1.2
(Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary) of Judicial Canon 1. Id. The Board acknowledged Judge
Benningfield’s good intentions but ultimately concluded that his order “could unduly coerce inmates
into undergoing a surgical procedure which would cause at least a temporary sterilization, and it was
therefore improper.” Id.
29. Catherine Saint Louis, A Tide of Opioid-Dependent Newborns Force Doctors to Rethink Treatment,
N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/13/health/opioid-addiction-babies.html.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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an inmate should be allowed to choose from a variety of options, one of which
being long-term birth control, in exchange for a reduced sentence.
II. CONTEXT
A. History of Involuntary Sterilization in the United States
The United States has a tumultuous history of sterilizing convicted criminals
for the purpose of limiting the transmission of criminality and other less desirable
traits to subsequent generations over the last hundred years.32 The eugenics
movement33 in the United States gained popularity in the early 1900s.34 During the
height of this movement, eugenicists advocated that “poverty, criminality,
illegitimacy, epilepsy, feeblemindedness, and alcoholism (among others) were
inherited traits that could not be altered”35 and, therefore, individuals who
possessed these traits should not be permitted to reproduce. In 1907, Indiana was
the first state to pass a statute giving state institutions the power to sterilize
convicted criminals and the mentally deficient.36 However, fourteen years after the
statute was passed, the Indiana Supreme Court in William v. Smith held that it was
unconstitutional.37 The William court found that the statute violated due process
by not allowing inmates to cross-examine experts or offer evidence as to why he
or she should not be sterilized.38
Twenty years after Indiana enacted the first involuntary sterilization statute,
the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether a statute authorizing the
sterilization of a “feeble-minded” woman was constitutional under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Carrie
Buck, a patient involuntarily committed to the State Colony for Epileptics and
Feeble Minded, was “the daughter of a feeble-minded mother . . . and the mother
of an illegitimate feeble-minded child.”40 The statute under which Buck was
sterilized contained procedural safeguards to ensure “the rights of the patient
[were] most carefully considered” including a hearing to determine whether

32. J. Michael Richardson, Note, Compulsory Sterilization: Weeding Mendel’s Garden, 22 DRAKE L.
REV. 355, 355 (1973).
33. Eugenics is the theory of creating social policies to improve the quality of the human
population by preventing individuals from passing on undesirable traits to offspring. Karen Norrgard,
Human Testing, the Eugenics Movement, and IRBs, NATURE EDUCATION (2008), https://www.nature.com/
scitable/topicpage/human-testing-the-eugenics-movement-and-irbs-724.
34. Teryn Bouche & Laura Rivard, America’s Hidden History: The Eugenics Movement, NATURE
EDUCATION (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.nature.com/scitable/forums/genetics-generation/america-shidden-history-the-eugenics-movement-123919444.
35. REBECCA M. KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA
1950-1980, at 1 (2011).
36. H. 364, 1907 Leg. (Ind. 1907); Oliver P. Schulingkamp, Comment, Sterilization of Habitual
Criminals, 5 LA. L. REV. 124, 124-25 (1942).
37. William v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2, 2 (Ind. 1921).
38. Id.
39. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
40. Id.
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sterilizing the patient was in the best interest of both the individual and society.41
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in one of the most notorious and harshly worded
Supreme Court decisions to date, reasoned that “[i]t is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve
for this imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from
continuing their kind.”42 Noting that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are
enough,” the Court ultimately held that the statute was constitutional because the
inmate was afforded due process of the law.43
By 1937, ten years after Buck v. Bell was decided, “there were twenty-eight
states with valid sterilization laws.”44 The nationwide sterilization efforts,
however, began to decline in the 1940s. After the start of World War II,
“sterilization became a lower priority when physicians were sent off to fight,
[giving] opponents of sterilization an opportunity to speak against it.”45
Additionally, after the public witnessed Adolf Hitler’s attempts to create a master
race through eugenics and forced-sterilization, “newfound support for human
rights emerged.”46 Public disclosure of the Tuskegee experiments47 also triggered
a turning point in the history of eugenics as Americans began to question the
ethical implications involved with sterilizing indigent minorities.48
By the 1940s the civil rights movement began gaining traction and the public
began to learn of the atrocities committed in Nazi Germany during World War II.
The Supreme Court was not impervious to the changing social environment. Thus,
in 1942, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Skinner v. Oklahoma and
considered the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act, which permitted the sterilization of habitual criminals who had been
convicted of two or more felonies.49 In this case, the jury faced only one question
when deciding whether an individual should be sterilized: whether a vasectomy
could be performed on the defendant without being detrimental to his general
health.50 The Court found the Act unconstitutional, stating that “[w]hen the law
lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality
of offense and sterilizes one and not the other” it deprives the defendant of equal
41. Id. at 206–07.
42. Id. at 207.
43. Id.
44. Schulingkamp, supra note 36, at 125 n. 5. These states are Alabama, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
45. Kimberly A. Smith, Note, Conceivable Sterilization: A Constitutional Analysis of a Norplant/DepoProvera Welfare Condition, 77 IND. L.J. 389, 392 (2002).
46. Id.
47. See Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics Past–Present,
and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 164 (2003). The Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment was a forty-year study
conducted by the Public Health Service in which researchers “targeted poor African-American
sharecroppers suffering from syphilis, but was presented to subjects as a study of ‘bad blood’” and is
known as “the longest non-therapeutic experiment on human beings in medical history.” Id.
48. See id. at 164–65.
49. Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537 (1942).
50. Id.
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protection of the law.51 The Court reasoned that because “marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,” an
infringement on the right to procreate requires strict scrutiny.52
Many viewed the Court’s ruling in Skinner as the end of the sterilization
movement.53 The Skinner Court, however, declined to explicitly overrule Buck v.
Bell by relying only on equal protection grounds, failing to analyze the statute's
constitutionality on due process grounds. In fact, the Supreme Court has never
expressly overruled Buck.54 The Skinner Court distinguished the Oklahoma
Sterilization Act from the act in Buck by acknowledging that Skinner was given no
opportunity to be “heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable potential
parent of socially undesirable offspring.”55 The Court also failed to discuss
whether the act was punitive in nature, whether it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment, or whether it violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.56 Because the Court was particularly concerned with the permanent
nature of sterilization and “did not specify whether temporary deprivations of the
same procreative right would be similarly scrutinized, the description of the
contested right in very general terms (as ‘procreation’) suggested that the
constitutional protection might prevent other limitations on reproduction.”57
In spite of the Court’s ruling in Skinner, lower level courts, state legislatures,
and correctional facilities still attempt to find ways in which defendants can be
sterilized.58 The California state legislature, in 2003, publicly apologized for the
“state’s past role in the eugenics movement and the injustice done to thousands of
California men and women.”59 However, the California state legislature seemingly
forgot this apology; between 2006 and 2010, California prisons sterilized nearly
150 female inmates,60 using tubal ligation,61 with thirty-nine of these inmates
failing to give proper consent.62 Seven states currently allow the chemical or

51. Id. at 541.
52. Id.
53. Smith, supra note 46, at 392.
54. Steven S. Spitz, The Norplant Debate: Birth Control or Woman Control?, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 131, 138 (1993).
55. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 538.
56. See id.
57. Joanna Nairn, Is There a Right to Have Children? Substantive Due Process and Probation Conditions
that Restrict Reproductive Rights, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 12 (2010).
58. See Toni Driver Saunders, Banning Motherhood: An RX to Combat Child Abuse?, 26 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 203, 220–26 (1994).
59. Alexandra Minna Stern, Eugenics, Sterilization, and Historical Memory in the United States, 23
HISTÓRIA 195, 206 (2016).
60. California Bans Sterilization of Female Inmates Without Consent, NBC NEWS (Sept. 26, 2014, 9:23
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/womens-health/california-bans-sterilization-female-inmateswithout-consent-n212256.
61. Tubal ligation is a process of permanent birth control in which the fallopian tubes are cut and
tied to prevent the egg from moving from the ovaries to the fallopian tubes. Tubal Ligation, MAYO
CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/tubal-ligation/about/pac-20388360 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2018).
62. California Bans Sterilization of Female Inmates Without Consent, supra note 60.
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surgical castration of sex offenders.63 As opioid users and prison populations
continue to rise,64 proponents of Judge Benningfield’s order find themselves
asking whether there is a real harm in preventing life-long criminals from
procreating.
B. Voluntary Sterilization
To address society’s interest in preventing habitual criminals from
procreating, courts, legislatures, and private parties have attempted to develop
creative, constitutional options that allow inmates to voluntarily undergo
sterilization procedures. For instance, private programs like Project Prevention
provide monetary compensation to men and women addicted to drugs and
alcohol in exchange for receiving long-term birth control procedures.65 Formally
known as Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K.), Project
Prevention pays drug-addicted women $200 “to receive tubal ligations, intrauterine devices (IUDs),66 five years of Norplant,67 or one year of Depo-Provera.”68
In 1991, a Kansas legislator proposed a bill offering to pay $500 to any female on
welfare who used Norplant and a subsequent $50 “a year as long as the
contraceptive remained implanted.”69 Although the bill was ultimately defeated,
it sparked debate over whether the Government should have such a “heavy . . .
hand on the scales of choice for the poor.”70
Judge Benningfield’s order is not the first time courts have offered criminal
defendants the opportunity to reduce their sentence in exchange for receiving a

63. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 645 (2017); FLA. STAT. § 794.0235 (2017); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-4 (2010);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:538 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-512 (2007); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.061
(West 2007); WIS. STAT. 302.11 (2016).
64. See Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, Wonkbook:11 Facts About America’s Prison Population, WONKBLOG:
WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/08/13/
wonkbook-11-facts-about-americas-prison-population/?utm_term=.07d3508144d4; Opioid Overdose
Crisis, NAT’L INST. HEALTH (Mar. 2018), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioidoverdose-crisis.
65. PROJECT PREVENTION, http://projectprevention.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
66. An IUD is a small device inserted into the uterus to prevent pregnancy by stopping the sperm
from reaching the egg. IUD, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/birthcontrol/iud (last visited Feb 25, 2018). Hormonal IUDs prevent pregnancy by: “1) thicken[ing] the
mucus that lives on the cervix, which blocks and traps the sperm, and 2) . . . [stopping] eggs from
leaving [the] ovaries.” Id.
67. Norplant was the first implant device on the market; it is essentially the same device as
Nexplanon. See Courtney A. Schreiber & Kurt Barnhart, Contraception, in YEN & JAFFE’S REPRODUCTIVE
ENDOCRINOLOGY 890, 893 (7th ed. 2014).
68. Depo-Provera is a birth control shot administered by a health care professional every three
months that prevents ovulation. Birth Control Shot, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.planned
parenthood.org/learn/birth-control/birth-control-shot (last visited Feb. 25, 2018); Adam B. Wolf, Note,
What Money Cannot Buy: A Legislative Response to C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 173, 173-74 (1999).
69. Tamar Levin, A Plan to Pay Welfare Mothers for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/09/us/a-plan-to-pay-welfare-mothers-for-birth-control.html.
70. Ellen Goodman, The Politics of Norplant, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 19, 1991),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1991/02/19/the-politics-of-norplant/cd090c53e187-45b4-b89d-a7d1027ecad4/?utm_term=.17183bcb6f91.
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sterilization procedure. In 1997 in Washington, a female defendant pled guilty to
second-degree murder and assault after murdering one of her sons and attempting
to murder another son.71 The Defendant agreed to undergo voluntary sterilization
in exchange for the State’s recommendation that she receive the low-end standard
range sentence for each crime.72 In Tennessee, a woman convicted of sexually
abusing her children agreed to sterilization as a term of her probation in lieu of
prison time.73 In 1998 in California, a judge gave a female defendant accused of
child abuse a choice between seven years in prison or one year in local jail if she
received a Norplant implant.74 Another judge has even taken this issue a step
further by offering a convicted rapist the choice between castration and thirty
years in prison.75
In contrast, higher-level courts generally disapprove of trial judges reducing
sentences in exchange for voluntary sterilization absent specific statutory
authorization.76 In Arizona, after sentencing two defendants to a maximum
sentence of two and a half years’ imprisonment, a trial judge offered them a yearlong sentence reduction if they agreed to voluntary sterilization.77 The Arizona
Supreme Court struck down the judge’s offer, finding that the judge exceeded the
scope of his jurisdiction because he acted without specific statutory or
constitutional authorization.78
It is difficult to determine an exact number of instances in which a judge has
offered or imposed a condition of sterilization. Cases in which a defendant does
not appeal a decision or in instances where judges withdraw their previous order
typically go unnoticed.79 A defendant is unlikely to question a sterilization
condition out of fear of serving a longer jail sentence. Unless these conditions
receive significant media attention, they remain unreported and undocumented.

71. State v. Pasicznyk, No. 14897-1-Ill, 1997 WL 79501, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1997).
72. Id.
73. Mark Curriden, Sterilization Ordered for Child Abusers, 79-MAY A.B.A. J. 32 (1993) (“The fact
that she agreed to it, completely voluntarily, makes this case different from the rest. You can waive
your constitutional rights and that’s what she did that day.”).
74. See Broadman v. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 959 P.2d 715, 725–26 (Cal. 1998)
(describing the facts of the unpublished case, People v. Johnson) (citing People v. Johnson, No. F015316,
1992 WL 685375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)). The California Court of Appeal was set to review the validity of
the Norplant probation condition, but after the defendant violated another term of her probation, the
case was dismissed as moot. Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control,
or Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18 (1992).
75. William E. Schmidt, Rape Sentence: Castration or 30 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 1983),
https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/26/us/rape-sentence-castration-or-30-years.html.
76. See, e.g., Briley v. California, 564 F.2d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]here is persuasive authority
that a court, at least when ordering the extreme remedy of sterilization, must have specific legislative
or common-law authority for doing so.”). However, these cases typically involve the sterilization of
mentally defective individuals. See e.g., Sparkman v. McFarlin, 552 F.2d 172, 175–76 (7th Cir. 1977);
Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1974); Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F.Supp. 671,
673–-74 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
77. Smith v. Superior Court of State In and For Coconino County, 725 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Ariz. 1986).
78. Id. at 1103.
79. Nairn, supra note 57, at 3–4.
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Without appellate review, judges can continue to offer creative sentencing
reductions without fully contemplating the social and ethical consequences.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Unconstitutional Conditions
Constitutional rights are not absolute, which means that criminal defendants
are free to waive their rights at any time. However, if an inmate chooses to waive
their rights in exchange for a promised benefit, the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions comes into play to ensure that an inmate is not being coerced into
giving up his or her constitutional rights. Higher level courts have found that
unconstitutional conditions arise “when government offers a benefit on condition
that the recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right
normally protects from government interference.”80 The unconstitutional
conditions doctrine asserts that a state or federal government may not “grant a
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right,” even
if the government is not obligated to provide individuals with that benefit.81
Essentially, the government may not indirectly bribe individuals with the promise
of “benefits and privileges to forego rights with which the government could not
interfere directly.”82 When the doctrine is applicable, it requires that a court
employs a strict scrutiny standard when analyzing the challenged condition if a
fundamental right is infringed upon.83 Under the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, to “condition a grant of a discretionary benefit on the release of a
constitutional right, the Government must have an interest which outweighs the
particular right at issue.”84
This doctrine does not arise if the government “is forbidden to provide a
benefit for reasons extraneous to any pressure on the beneficiary’s rights,” or if the
government is obligated to provide a benefit.85 The doctrine has two components:
“the conditioned government benefit on the one hand and the affected
constitutional right on the other.”86 Four variables are analyzed to determine
whether unconstitutional conditions are attached to state-proffered benefits: “(1)
the nature of the right affected; (2) the degree of infringement of the right; (3) the
nature of the benefit offered; and (4) the strength and nature of the state’s interest
in conditioning the benefit.”87 Coercive conditions become unconstitutional when
they “pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”88
Under Judge Benningfield’s order, the unconstitutional conditions principle
becomes relevant because the thirty-day benefit will be granted only to recipients
80. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1421–22 (1989).
81. Id. at 1415.
82. John Robert Hand, Buying Fertility: The Constitutionality of Welfare Bonuses for Welfare Mothers
Who Submit Norplant Insertion, 46 VAND. L. REV. 715, 716 (1993).
83. 16A AM. JUR. 2D CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 411 (2018).
84. Id.
85. Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1422–23.
86. Id. at 1422.
87. Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144, 151 (1968).
88. Sullivan, supra note 80, at 1428.
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who receive either a vasectomy or a Nexplanon implant. This condition is
inherently coercive as these prisoners are already deprived of their civil liberties.
Because the inmates eligible for the order are only convicted of misdemeanors,
they face a maximum statutory sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days.89
The thirty-day reduction represents a significant portion of the maximum sentence
an inmate can serve.
Judge Benningfield asserted that the sterilization program is strictly
voluntary.90 However, because the jail holds defendants for short-term sentences,
many of these inmates are likely to be going through drug-withdrawals and are
not in a position to make a reasoned decision regarding whether they should
partake in such a serious and long-term procedure.91 For example, one inmate,
after receiving the Nexplanon implant, attempted to remove the implant from her
arm with a razor blade while she was still incarcerated.92 This order effectively
gives inmates an ultimatum: either stay incarcerated, a restraint on personal
freedom, or become sterilized, a restraint on personal autonomy.
Furthermore, prison inmates represent some of the most vulnerable members
of society. Incarcerated women are especially vulnerable to coercive effects, with
approximately forty-five percent of incarcerated women reporting histories of
mental health problems, forty percent experiencing childhood physical abuse,
sixty percent reporting forced sexual activity, and sixty-seven percent reporting
domestic violence.93 Because inmates are especially susceptible to coercive effects,
precautions must be taken to ensure that prison officials do not pressure inmates
into accepting unwanted offers.
Advocates of the order argue that the thirty-day sentence reduction is not a
significant decrease in time and, therefore, does not fully reach the level of
coercion.94 Other prison programs offer substantially longer sentence reductions
and have avoided being struck down on constitutional grounds.95 Prisons have
previously offered other kinds of invasive procedures in exchange for reduced
sentences; for example, from the 1950s to the 1980s, prisoners could donate blood

89. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40–35–111 (2010).
90. Benningfield, supra note 9.
91. Complaint at 4, Sullivan v. Benningfield, No. 17-cv-69 (Tenn. Ch. filed Aug. 24, 2017).
92. Amended Complaint at 6, Sullivan v. Benningfield, No. 17-cv-00052 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 9, 2017),
ECF No. 13.
93. Megha Ramaswarmy & Patricia J. Kelly, Factors Associated with Sterilization use Among Women
Leaving a U.S. Jail: A Mixed Methods Study, 14 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 773, 773 (2014).
94. Wesley Messamore, Make Voluntary Sterilization a Requirement for Welfare, HUMBLE
LIBERTARIAN (Aug.
22,
2018),
http://www.humblelibertarian.com/2018/08/make-voluntarysterilization.html.
95. There are four programs offered by the Bureau of Prisons that reduce sentences. Inmates are
eligible for up to a twelve-month sentence reduction when the offender completes five hundred hours
in a drug program. Frequently Asked Questions About the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP), FAMM,
https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/FAQ-Residential-Drug-Abuse-Program-5.3.pdf (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018). Another program offers inmates a twelve-month reduction if the inmate spends that
time in a half-way house. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1) (West 2008). Inmates can also ask for compassionate
release or a commutation of sentence. Nathan James, Early Release for Federal Inmates: Fact Sheet, CONG.
RES. SERV. (Feb. 3, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43392.pdf.

Adams Final Article 3.0 (Do Not Delete)

34 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

12/15/2018 4:02 PM

Volume 26:23 2018

in exchange for good-time credit.96 Judge Benningfield’s order also did not
threaten to punish inmates who did not take advantage of his order.97 In other
words, inmates were no worse off if they decided not to undergo the procedure.
These arguments, however, hold little weight when considered alongside the high
levels of coercion and the limitations on personal freedom. While blood donation
invades an individual’s right to privacy, the level of invasion is minor when
compared to the order’s invasion on reproductive freedom. The order far
surpasses previous interference with an individual’s right to privacy.
Opponents of the order point out that Judge Benningfield did not allow
inmates to consider alternate forms of contraception and restricted them to a
limited selection of available birth control methods.98 While other forms of birth
control are extremely popular, only 1.3 percent of female contraceptive users rely
on implants like Nexplanon and 8.2 percent of male contraceptive users on a
vasectomy as their choice of a contraceptive method.99 Most inmates in this
situation, when faced with an option to reduce their prison sentence, would accept
the conditions of Judge Benningfield’s order without considering the possible
health effects. Both vasectomies and Nexplanon can have serious health effects
and may not be the right birth-control option for every inmate.100 Faced with the
blinders of a sentence reduction, inmates are unlikely to fully consider these
potential health effects. Furthermore, the prison environment may cause
individuals to exercise poor judgment in an important life decision and to decide
to undergo the procedure when other methods of birth control might be better
suited for them. These limitations and the high levels of coercion would likely
trigger the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and require a court to analyze the
order’s condition with a higher level of scrutiny.
B.

Procreation as a Fundamental Right

If a court does not apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, “then no
interference with any right would exist and a challenge to the law would fail.”101
Presuming that the court found it appropriate to apply the doctrine and found an
interference with a right, the next step would be for the court to determine if the
right to procreate is a fundamental right and which level of scrutiny should be
applied. Because the right to reproduce is not explicitly listed in the Constitution,
it is necessary to determine whether this right is included within the “penumbras,
formed by emanations” of the Bill of Rights that are intrinsic to individual

96. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, The Exchange of Inmate Organs for Liberty: Diminishing the “Yuck Factor”
in the Bioethics Repugnance Debate, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 132 (2013).
97. See Benningfield, supra note 1.
98. See Kalhan Rosenblatt, Judge Offers Inmates Reduced Sentences in Exchange for Vasectomy, NBC
NEWS (July 21, 2017, 10:15 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-offers-inmatesreduced-sentences-exchange-vasectomy-n785256.
99. Contraceptive Use in the United States, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, https://www.guttmacher.org/
fact-sheet/contraceptive-use-united-states (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
100. Arthur Allen, Vasectomy Risks and Benefits, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/men/features/
vasectomy-risks-benefits#1 (last visited Feb. 25, 2018); Risks and Side Effects of Nexplanon, NEXPLANON,
https://www.nexplanon.com/side-effects (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
101. Hand, supra note 82, at 744.
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liberty.102 In Skinner, the Court determined that “marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”103 The Court, however,
has more recently shied away from its previous ruling and has placed limitations
on the right to reproduce.104
While the right to avoid procreation through abortion or contraceptive use
has received explicit legal recognition,105 the right to procreate has received
significantly less legal attention.106 Because the Government rarely attempts to
prevent individuals from reproducing, there is little litigation directly on point.107
However, according to many academics, existing case law implies that a right to
reproduce does exist.108 The Court, in dicta, in Meyer v. Nebraska concluded that
“[w]ithout doubt, [the liberties included in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up
children.”109 The Skinner Court not only determined that the right to procreation
exists; it also held that the freedom to procreate was a fundamental right that is
entitled to the highest level of judicial scrutiny.110
The Court further expanded on Skinner in Eisenstadt v. Baird where it
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that criminalized the disbursement of
contraceptives to unmarried individuals.111 Although the Eisenstadt Court’s
holding relied on equal protection—rather than substantive due process
grounds—it nevertheless reiterated the claims the Court made in Skinner and
Meyer: “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.”112
Recently, the Court has moved away from the “penumbral right to privacy”
and has instead found that the right to reproduce is found within the liberty
interest of the Fourteenth Amendment.113 For example, in Planned Parenthood of
Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held that “matters, involving the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to

102.
103.
104.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
Gayle Binion, Reproductive Freedom and the Constitution: The Limits on Choice, 4 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 12, 24–27 (1988).
105. See generally, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
106. John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New
Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 954–67 (1986).
107. Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce, 65 ALB. L. REV. 625, 627 (2002).
108. Id. at 628.
109. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).
110. Skinner v. State of Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
111. Foley, supra note 107, at 628.
112. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
113. Foley, supra note 107, at 629.
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personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”114
While “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from
the protections of the Constitution,”115 it is not likely that the fundamental right to
reproduce extends within prison walls. In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court
refused to apply strict scrutiny to conditions that violated prisoner’s constitutional
rights because the Court did not want to “hamper [prison administrators’] ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration.”116 The Court then created the reasonablenessbased Turner standard of review, in which a “prison inmate retains those
[constitutional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.”117
The Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have both applied the Turner
standard and found that the right to procreate does not survive incarceration. In
Gerber v. Hickman,118 the Ninth Circuit found that the “right to procreate was
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration” and held that it was permissible
for prison officials to prevent inmates from mailing sperm to a laboratory.119 The
Gerber Court rejected the argument that under Skinner, inmates have a
constitutional right to procreate, determining that “[t]he right to procreate while
incarcerated and the right to be free from surgical sterilization by prison officials
are two very different things. There is simply no comparison between sterilization
. . . and denial of the facilitation of artificial insemination.”120 In Goodwin v. Turner,
the Eighth Circuit assumed, without making a specific finding, that an inmate’s
right to procreate did survive incarceration.121 In applying the Turner test,
however, the court upheld “the prison administrators’ denial of Goodwin’s
request, finding that the restriction satisfied the [Turner test] because it was
rationally related to the legitimate penological interest of ‘treating all inmates
equally.’”122

114. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
115. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987).
116. Tanner Minot, Note, Are We Sterilizing Prisoners?: Why Courts Should Prevent Prison
Administrators from Denying Prisoners the Fundamental Right to Procreate, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 323,
329 (2013).
117. Turner, 482 U.S. at 95.
118. See generally Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
119. Minot, supra note 116, at 336.
120. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 622.
121. Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (1990) (holding that the Bureau of Prisons had a
legitimate penological interest in refusing to allow an inmate to “ejaculate into a clean container so that
his semen could be used to artificially inseminate his wife.”).
122. Minot, supra note 116, at 334. Under the Turner standard, a four-part balancing test must be
applied to determine the reasonableness of a challenged prison regulation: (1) “there must be a ‘valid,
rational connection’ between the prison policy [at issue] and the legitimate government interest put
forward to justify it;” (2) deference must be given to prison policies that provide alternative ways for
inmates to exercise the protected right; (3) courts must consider “the impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally;” and (4) “the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a
prison regulation.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.
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Therefore, based on prior court precedent, the fundamental right to
reproduce arguably exists only outside of the prison setting. The question now
becomes what standard of review applies to a condition that infringes the right to
procreate both while an inmate is incarcerated and once the individual is released.
C.

Standard of Scrutiny

It is likely that to successfully challenge Judge Benningfield’s order under the
Constitution, an individual must demonstrate that the order interferes with a right
or liberty under the Due Process Clause123 or some type of suspect classification
under the Equal Protection Clause.124 Courts must apply a strict standard of
scrutiny to issues related to such fundamental rights.125 Under this standard, the
state may only deprive individuals of these fundamental rights when the
interference is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate objective
that furthers a compelling government interest.126 Said differently, strict scrutiny
requires (1) “that the law [or order] in question promote a compelling government
interest” and (2) that there are no less intrusive alternatives available.127
Although reproduction is a fundamental right while an individual is free
from incarceration, precedent gives the impression that this right does not extend
to those inside prison walls.128 However, since the insertion of Nexplanon implants
and vasectomies performed during incarceration continue to remain effective once
the individual is released, a court will likely apply strict scrutiny because the order
interferes with a prisoner’s ability to reproduce once she is no longer an inmate.129
Because the conditions affect the individual both while he or she is incarcerated
and once released, strict scrutiny must apply. Although an inmate can get the
sterilization procedure reversed immediately upon prison release, it is difficult for
lower-income individuals to afford the high costs associated with reversal of a
vasectomy or removal of an implant.130
123. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONT. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Due Process Clause guarantees both procedural and substantive rights. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
272 (1994). Under substantive due process, the Government has limited power in depriving individuals
of life, liberty, or property. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO LAW REV. 1501, 1501
(1999).
124. Hand, supra note 82, at 719.
125. David M. Treiman, Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights – A Judicial Shell Game, 15 TULSA L.
J. 183, 184 (2013).
126. Martha J. Hess, Note, Constitutional Law – Equal Protection – Benign Classifications Based on Race
Must Be Narrowly Tailored to Achieve a Compelling Governmental Interest, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 493, 496 (1989).
127. Hand, supra note 82, at 722.
128. See e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 622 (9th Cir.
2002).
129. Nexplanon implants remain effective for three years; after the three-year time period, it
should be medically removed. What is NEXPLANON (Etonogestrel Implant)?, supra note 3. A vasectomy
remains effective unless it is reversed. See Can You Reverse a Vasectomy? 5 Things You Need to Know,
BIRTHCONTROL.COM, https://www.birthcontrol.com/can-you-reverse-a-vasectomy/ (last visited Oct.
18, 2018).
130. An inmate who received Nexplanon inquired as to whether she could have the procedure
reversed; the county informed her that she would have to pay $250 to do so. Ward v. Shoupe, No. 17-
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Thus, under the strict scrutiny standard, Benningfield’s order is likely
unconstitutional. However, the government would likely argue that because drug
offenders currently incarcerated in White County could potentially give birth to
drug-babies, states have a legitimate and compelling interest in controlling the
number of children born with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome (NAS), a disorder
in which newborns are born with symptoms of withdrawal.131 The syndrome “can
occur in 55 to 94% of newborns whose mothers were addicted to or treated with
opioids while pregnant.”132 In Tennessee alone, opioid and heroin overdose deaths
have increased by eighty-seven percent since 2011 and the number of NAS cases
have increased by sixty-two percent.133 Nevertheless, because the state has other,
less restrictive ways to control the number of infants born with NAS, the order will
likely fail to meet the strict scrutiny standard and would consequently be
unconstitutional. Some of these less restrictive means include accessibility to
adequate drug treatment facilities and classes teaching inmates about the
consequences of prenatal drug-use.
If, arguendo, the Court fails to find that the order interferes with a
fundamental right, strict scrutiny no longer applies and the Court must next apply
a lower level of scrutiny. Because the order specifies non-permanent means of
birth control that can be reversed once the inmate is released, the state could argue
that the fundamental right to reproduce is only restricted while an inmate is
incarcerated. Therefore, a court that does not apply a strict scrutiny standard
would likely apply something similar to the Turner standard.134
It could be argued that the Turner standard only applies to “prison
administrators . . ., and not the courts”135 and would not be applicable to Judge
Benningfield’s order. Because the sentence reduction is applied retroactively by
the judiciary but is administered and controlled by the jail, it is unclear whether
the order is considered a prison regulation. However, a court in favor of the order
that believes inmate sterilization can provide welfare and reproductive benefits
would likely hold that the Turner standard applies and, thus, apply a lower level
of scrutiny.136
Opponents of the order say that it is a form of racially charged eugenics,
aiming to control the population of lower-class, uneducated minorities.137
However, this was not likely Judge Benningfield’s intent, as ninety-seven percent

cv-00047, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. filed Aug. 16, 2017). Implant removal typically costs between $0 and $300.
How Can I Get the Birth Control Implant?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/
learn/birth-control/birth-control-implant-implanon/how-can-i-get-the-birth-control-implant
(last
visited Oct. 18, 2018).
131. See Karen McQueen & Jodie Murphy-Oikonen, Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome, 375 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2468, 2469 (2016).
132. Id.
133. COURTNEE MELTON & MANDY PELLEGRIN, THE SYCAMORE INSTIT., THE OPIOID EPIDEMIC IN
TENNESSEE 2 (2017).
134. See generally Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
135. Id. at 89.
136. This is not to say, however, that a rational court would ever apply this standard. It remains
the author’s position that strict scrutiny should apply and the order should be found unconstitutional.
137. Lussenhop, supra note 8.
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of the county’s population is white.138 Even though statistics are not available of
the racial breakdown of inmates in the White County Jail, “the heterogeneity of
the county suggests that race is likely not a significant factor.”139 While prison
populations overwhelmingly represent low-income minorities, the order does not
target one specific type of inmate. Therefore, the order would not need to
overcome the strict level of scrutiny required under the Equal Protection Clause
because it does not intentionally target individuals based on race.
Opponents of the order also question the effectiveness of sterilizing male
drug users who are unable to damage the fetus from prenatal drug use. A 1991
study found that paternal drug-use may cause health complications during fetal
development: “cocaine may attach itself to the sperm of men who use the drug,
entering an egg at the moment of conception and damage the fetus.”140 This study’s
findings could mean that fathers may be more responsible for drug-related health
effects than previously suspected. However, more recent studies, did not indicate
that paternal drug use is an “important risk factor for adverse pregnancy
outcomes.”141 Regardless of whether paternal drug use affects fetal development,
Judge Benningfield stated that his order was aimed primarily at the female
population but extended the program to men to avoid gender discrimination.142
Nevertheless, a male inmate could argue that the order violates the Equal
Protection Clause143 because it discriminates against individuals on the basis of
gender, noting that a vasectomy is a much more invasive and permanent
procedure than the insertion of a Nexplanon implant. Matters involving gender
classification, however, only require courts to apply an intermediate level of
scrutiny. The order does not directly discriminate against gender; it does so
indirectly since men are required to undergo a more serious procedure. To
reiterate, Nexplanon is not permanent because it must be removed and replaced
after three years, via a simple, out-patient procedure.144 In contrast, while
vasectomy reversal is successful in about ninety-five percent of men, this
procedure requires a general anesthetic, takes about four to five hours to complete,

138.

Joshua Sager, Modern Eugenics: Inmates Trade Time of Sentences for Sterilization, TRUTH AGAINST
(Aug. 18, 2017).
139. Id.
140. Cocaine-Using Fathers Linked to Birth Defects, NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 15, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/15/science/cocaine-using-fathers-linked-to-birth-defects.html;
see
also Ricardo A. Yazigi, Demonstration of Specific Binding of Cocaine to Human Spermatozoa, 266 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N. 1955 (1991).
141. Anders Engeland et al., Effects of Preconceptional Paternal Drug Exposure on Birth Outcomes:
Cohort Study of 340000 Pregnancies Using Norwegian Population-Based Databases, 75 BRIT. J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 1134, 1134 (Aug. 17, 2012), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC3612732/pdf/bcp0075-1134.pdf.
142. Benningfield, supra note 9, at 1.
143. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no state shall “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONT. amend. XIV, § 1. This
clause applies “when an individual in one class has been treated differently than an individual in
another class because of certain classifications.” Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Feminist Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women’s Rights during Pregnancy,
26 LAW & INEQ. 171, 189 (2008).
144. What is NEXPLANON (Etonogestrel Implant)?, supra note 3.
THE MACHINE
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and is much more expensive than the removal of Nexplanon.145 Therefore, even
though the order does not facially discriminate against gender, male inmates who
choose to undergo one of the proposed long-term birth control (or sterilization)
procedures will face significantly more cost and difficulty if they choose to reverse
the procedure. However, because the state does not intentionally target a semisuspect classification, such as gender, the order is likely constitutional under
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.
Under Benningfield’s order, women past their reproductive age are ineligible
to receive the sentence reduction.146 This condition begs the question of what
would happen to inmates who agree to the conditions for sentence reductions but
discover that the available birth control options would be detrimental to their
health. Would these inmates also be ineligible for the sentence reduction? Judge
Benningfield’s order did not consider this question. While this may seem unfairly
discriminatory, it would likely be upheld if a court applies a minimum standard
of review. For example, courts will generally apply a rational basis standard, a
level of minimum scrutiny, for discrimination based on age.147 Under this
standard, the government may intentionally target a non-suspect classification
with a law that is rationally related to a legitimate government interest.148 Because
discriminatory laws are almost always upheld under minimum scrutiny149 and
because, as previously discussed, states have an important governmental interest
in preventing drug offenders from using drugs while pregnant, the order will
likely pass a minimum standard of review.
D. Scope of the Judiciary
Opponents of the order also contend that it denies inmates’ procedural due
process as the order falls outside the scope of the judiciary.150 The establishment of
sentencing ranges, criminal offense classes, mitigating and aggravating factors,
and all other matters related to criminal sentencing, while at the trial judge’s
discretion, are initially enacted by the State and Federal legislatures.151 Because
Tennessee has not enacted a statute permitting a judge to modify the length of a
defendant’s sentence, the order likely violates an inmate’s procedural due process
rights. However, this Tennessee state legislature gave jail administrators the
power to place defendants in “rehabilitative programs for which the defendant is
eligible under the rules and regulations adopted by the institution.”152 In other
words, it is ultimately a decision for the local jail to determine who is eligible to
receive the sentence reduction. However, it remains unclear whether Judge
145. Peter Jaret, The Myths and Realities of a Vasectomy, THE NEW YORK TIMES (June 27, 2008).
146. See Rosenblatt, supra note 98.
147. Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a DecadesOld Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 219 (2010).
148. Julia Kobick, Discriminatory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality and Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 521 (2010).
149. THOMAS LUNDMARK, POWER & RIGHTS IN US CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 194 (2008).
150. Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 14, Sullivan v. Benningfield, No.
17-cv-00052 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 9, 2017), ECF No. 13.
151. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS § 18-3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994).
152. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-318 (2010).
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Benningfield even had the power to create a new “program” since he is not a
representative of the jail. Typically, judges can only make recommendations to
correctional facilities and lack the authority to determine anything other than the
sentence imposed.153
Therefore, it is ultimately the jail sheriff’s responsibility to refuse the
implementation of the order. Sheriff Oddie Shoupe, however, was the individual
who initially approached Judge Benningfield and requested that the judge enter
an order allowing inmates to receive a reduced sentence for undergoing
sterilization.154 Nevertheless, in Tennessee, there is no statutory authorization
allowing the county jail to enact this type of program. Thus, the order denies
inmates procedural due process because a state actor, not the legislature, is
preventing inmates from exercising a fundamental right.
Under procedural due process, the state must provide adequate notice and
an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision maker before depriving
individuals of life, liberty, or property.155 Individuals who voluntarily sign up for
the order waive their procedural due process rights. Here, the individual, not the
state, is depriving themselves of their right to personal autonomy. This could also
be seen as a waiver of substantive due process since the individuals elect to receive
the procedure and thereby deny themselves of their reproductive freedom.
However, if the Court finds that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
applies, discussed in part III, individuals are not able to knowingly waive these
rights. Ultimately, the order falls outside the scope of the judiciary and is far too
coercive to pass constitutional muster. Therefore, alternative solutions should be
proposed to tackle both the drug abuse crisis and the increasing incidence of NAS
in the United States.
IV. SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES AND AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
Instead of instituting an exchange of reproductive rights for a lesser sentence,
inmates should be given the option to select a program associated with possible
sentence reductions that best suits his or her specific needs. For example, the
Neonatal Syndrome Education Program currently offered by the White County
Jail could be expanded to be a more intensive program that not only educates
inmates about how prenatal drug use can affect fetal development but also teaches
parents strategies to effectively raise children in an environment devoid of
narcotics. Other types of programs, like the Residential Drug Abuse Program
(RDAP) offered by the Federal Bureau of Prison,156 could also be made available to

153. See Statement from Kathleen M. Hawk, Director, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Judicial
Recommendations and U.S. Attorney Reports, Responses to, at 3 (June 30, 1997),
https://www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5070_010.pdf.
154. Ward v. Shoupe, No. 17-cv-00047, at *11 (M.D. Tenn. filed Aug. 16, 2017).
155. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) (noting that the “central meaning of procedural due
process” is the “right to notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner”).
156. RDAP is a nine-month intensive program in which inmates participate in CognitiveBehavioral Therapy to learn about substance abuse and its effects to receive up to a twelve month
sentence reduction. Substance Abuse Treatment, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/
inmates/custody_and_care/substance_abuse_treatment.jsp (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
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lower-level offenders. However, it would ultimately be the prerogative of each
state legislature to decide which programs to offer these individuals. While longterm birth control could also be an available option in exchange for a reduced
sentence, other programs, such as those listed above, must also be available to
ensure that inmates do not feel coerced or compelled to relinquish their
reproductive freedom.
By offering only one option to receive a significant sentence reduction, many
inmates feel compelled to accept the condition in exchange for an earlier release.
For example, in 1988, an Indiana judge offered a persuasive proposal when
sentencing a defendant charged with murder after the defendant fed her fouryear-old son a fatal dose of psychiatric drugs.157 While the judge made it clear that
he lacked the authority to involuntarily sterilize the defendant, he suggested that
he would be more lenient in sentencing her if she received a sterilization
procedure.158 The judge called it a “mitigating circumstance”159 and indicated that
if the defendant rejected the sterilization offer, it would not negatively impact
her.160 The defendant received the sterilization procedure and was sentenced to ten
years; the maximum sentence she could have received was twenty years.161 After
being sentenced, the defendant claimed that she regretted her sterilization
decision but felt that “it was the only way.”162
One potential solution for this “post-sterilization regret” would be to provide
inmates with more sentence reduction options other than just sterilization for the
possibility of reduced sentences. More viable options from which a drug offender
could choose from would lessen concerns about coercion.
It is also worth noting that because drug use163 is the only type of offense that
directly impacts fetal development, these programs will only be offered to drug
offenders. Nexplanon implants or vasectomies are not substantial remedies for
child abuse as the abuse involves after-birth, and not pre-birth, conduct.
Sterilization is “an improper and ineffective ‘shortcut’ to a complex psycho-social
problem. At its very best, [sterilization] would only temporarily address one
aspect of the problem: the ability of a woman to conceive and possibly abuse her
future children.”164 Although these options would provide the possibility of a
reduced sentence only for drug offenders,165 they should be made available to all
inmates who are interested in learning how to channel their thoughts, feelings and
157. Woman Who Was Sterilized for Lighter Sentence Says She’s Angry, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 15,
1988, 1:56 PM).
158. Rachel Roth, “No New Babies?” Gender Inequality and Reproductive Control in the Criminal Justice
and Prisons System, 12 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & LAW 391, 407 (2004).
159. Id.
160. Plan to Sterilize Woman is Debated, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/
1988/09/25/us/plan-to-sterilize-woman-is-debated.html.
161. Woman Who Was Sterilized for Lighter Sentence Says She’s Angry, supra note 157.
162. Id.
163. This Article considers alcohol a drug and, therefore, offenses involving alcohol, such as
Driving Under the Influence, would be included in the categorization.
164. Spitz, supra note 54 at 167–68.
165. This does not present a legal issue to only provide a benefit to one type of treatment as the
Federal Bureau of Prisons currently offers a sentence reduction program only to drug offenders.
Substance Abuse Treatment, supra note 156.
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behaviors once they are released from prison. Currently, over fifty percent of
inmates, regardless of what crimes they are incarcerated for, have a substance use
disorder.166 Therefore, while only drug offenders will reap a tangible benefit from
these programs, all offenders could benefit from the skills taught in these classes.
Each state legislature would be required to statutorily enact programs that
would be available to the inmates. Once an inmate receives sterilization or
completes one of the various programs listed in the statute or code, she would
automatically be eligible for a sentence reduction. If an offender chooses to receive
a sterilization procedure in lieu of participating in a rigorous class or program, she
would still receive the same sentence reduction as if she opted to receive training.
In reality, some inmates may decide to receive sterilization procedures instead of
attending rigorous classes and programs. Because an inmate would be given a list
of sentence reduction options, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine arguably
would not apply, or would at least not be as extreme, because the inmate is not
compelled to receive the procedure.
Nevertheless, this solution is in no way perfect. In an ideal world, the criminal
justice system should educate inmates on general sex education and, more
specifically, on the dangers of using drugs while pregnant. Inmates should have
access to affordable reproductive health care and sexually transmittable diseases
(STD) testing both while incarcerated and once they are released. Inmates should
also have access to extensive drug treatment programs not only in federal prisons
but also at the state level.167 However, state legislatures and jails are unlikely to
provide these types of programs due to preconceived notions that they will be too
costly to implement. Yet in reality, these programs would be less expensive than
the associated costs of treating infants born with NAS.168 Additionally, these
rehabilitation programs, though initially expensive to implement, could
ultimately decrease the recidivism rate which would, in turn, decrease the
overhead costs of prisons.169

166. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DRUG USE, DEPENDENCE, AND ABUSE AMONG STATE
PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2007-2009 (2017) (The 2007-2009 reports were the most recent data
available on inmate substance abuse as of 2017).
167. See Bernadette Pelissier et al., Triad Drug Treatment Evaluation Project, 65 FED. PROBATION 3
(2001) for an in-depth analysis on the Bureau of Prisons’ residential drug abuse treatment programs.
168. Compare Tammy E. Corr & Christopher S. Hollenbeak, The Economic Burden of Neonatal
Abstinence Syndrome in the United States, 112 ADDICTION 1590, 1599 (2017) (“The economic burden is
substantial with more than $315 million spent in newborn admission costs in 2012.”), with Alexander
Cowell et al., The Cost of Implementing a Jail Diversion Program for People with Mental Illness in San Antonio,
Texas, 48 EVAL. & PROGRAM PLANNING 57, 59 (2015) (“The estimated cost to start up the program over
the 2001–2003 period was $556,638.69.”), and Allie Bidwell, Report: Prison Education Programs Could Save
Money, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013, 2:23 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/08/22/reportprison-education-programs-could-save-money (“Educational programs cost about $1,400 to $1,744 per
inmate each year, according to the report, and can save prisons between $8,700 and $9,700 per inmate,
the costs associated with incarcerating them again.”).
169. Jacob Reich, The Economic Impact of Prison Rehabilitation Programs, UNIV. OF PENN. (Aug. 17,
2017),
https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/news/2059-the-economic-impact-of-prisonrehabilitation/for-students/blog/news.php.
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V. CONCLUSION
Judge Benningfield’s order is at the very least ethically and socially immoral.
Furthermore, due to the intimate nature of long-term birth control as a “private
and constitutionally protective activity, the potential for unusual and serious
emotional and physical consequences, and the similarities of involuntary
sterilization,”170 the order is also likely unconstitutional. The added element of
consent and voluntariness is not enough to make the order constitutional because
the highly coercive environment ensures that the order’s offer is not fully
considered by the inmates. The order also falls outside the scope of the judiciary
and should have legislative authorization before being utilized. Instead of
sterilization being the only option for a sentence reduction, inmates should be
given more expanded options; thus, in addition to signing up for long-term birth
control, they should also be offered alternative opportunities for attending classes
or programs to become more aware of the negative impacts of drug usage on
reproductive outcomes.
Eugenics and involuntary sterilization have been negatively perceived from a
societal perspective for generations. From “mass sterilizations in Nazi Germany to
eugenics experimentation in Tuskegee, Alabama, eugenics is anathema to any
conception of morality and represents one of the most disturbing chapters in the
dark history of human cruelty.”171 Judge Benningfield’s order brings us back to a
time when society supported the idea that certain types of people are unfit to
reproduce and should be eliminated from the population’s gene pool. Although
the order was ultimately rescinded, it should be taken seriously and viewed as a
wakeup call for the criminal justice system to re-evaluate and provide adequate
treatment options for inmates struggling with addiction.

170. Denise Edson Stich, Alternative Sentencing or Reproduction Control: Should California Courts use
Norplant to Protect Future Children from Child Abuse and Fetal Abuse?, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1017, 1043
(1993) (discussing the constitutionality of making Norplant, a long-term birth control method similar
to Nexplanon, a condition of probation).
171. Sullivan v. Benningfield, No. 2:17-cv-00052, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. filed Oct. 9, 2017).

